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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219) 
STTRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Defendant Beuchert Builders, Inc. 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-8300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY COLOUR, INC., a Utah 
corporation, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Civil No. 950400580 CV 
BEUCHERT BUILDERS, INC., a Utah Judge Howard H. Maetani 
corporation, : 
Defendant. : 
Defendant Beuchert Builders, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Enlargement of 
Time came before the Court at a hearing on Monday, January 22, 1996, at 10:00 a.m. The 
Plaintiff was represented by counsel Martin K. Banks, and the Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. The Court heard the arguments of counsel, 
reviewed the pleadings and paper on file, and entered a Memorandum Decision dated January 
29, 1996. Having fully considered the Plaintiffs Complaint and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 
(1991) as more completely set forth in the Court's January 29, 1996 Memorandum Decision, 
and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following: 
FILED 
dPsjdrSk-J-
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
is hereby granted. 
2. Each one of Plaintiffs seven claims for relief included in its Complaint are 
dismissed as a matter of law as time barred by the statute of limitations found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1991). 
3. Plaintiffs Complaint is therefore dismissed as a matter of law with prejudice. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time is now moot subject to the Court's 
granting of Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this ft day of February, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
; ^ ^ 
By: 
Honorable Howard H. Maetani 
Fourth District Court Judge 
c: \pl\bcuchcrt\caUrgc .ord 2 2-1-96 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1996,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of ORDER ON DEFENDANT BEUCHERT BUILDER, 
INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS, to the following: 
Martin K. Banks 
STOEL RIVES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904 
c:\pl\bcuchcrt\colargc.ord 3 2-1-96 
STOEL RIVES S.LC. 
JAN 3 1 1996 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 QcnnMC 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH nfcCtlVED 
VALLEY COLOUR, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEUCHERT BUILDERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950400580 
DATE: January 29, 1996 
JUDGE: HOWARD H. MAETANI 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant, Beuchert Builder's 12(b)(6) Motion 
To Dismiss filed on or about December 13, 1995. Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. represents 
Defendant, Beuchert Builders. Plaintiff, Valley Colour, is represented by Martin K. Banks. 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about July 20, 1991 the parties entered into an agreement whereby Beuchert 
Builders agreed to perform remodeling construction work at a residential property owned by 
Valley Colour located at 10415 North, Oak Circle, Highland, Utah. See Complaint If 5. 
On or about July 27, 1991 Beuchert Builders, Inc., started construction pursuant to the 
agreement. See Complaint ^ 8. 
From August, 1991 to December 1991, Plaintiff, Valley Colour made payments to 
Defendant pursuant to the agreement totalling $41,137.85. See Complaint ^ 11. 
On or about December 2, 1991 Defendant, Beuchert Builders, abandoned the project 
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even though the work was not complete. See Complaint ^ 12. 
On or about February 27, 1992, Defendant Beuchert placed a lien on the property in 
the amount of SI9,600. See Complaint \ 13. 
From February of 1992 until June of 1992, Plaintiff, Valley Colour, attempted to 
obtain financing to complete the construction. They were unsuccessful in obtaining financing 
on the property. See Complaint <[f 14. 
From approximately June of 1992 until approximately June of 1993, Plaintiff 
attempted to sell the property on an "as is" basis. See Complaint ^ 15. 
On or about June of 1993, Central Bank foreclosed on the Property. See Complaint \ 
20. 
On or about October of 1993, Central Bank sold the Property. See Complaint U 18. 
On or about September 25, 1995 Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court, alleging 
the following causes of action: Breach of Contract; Repudiation of Contract; 
Misrepresentation; Unjust Enrichment; Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
Tortious Interference; and Slander of Title. See Complaint ffi[ 21, 18, 34, 40, 45, 50 and 59. 
Based on these causes of action, Plaintiff prayed for compensatory damages in an 
amount not less that $175,000 plus interest, and costs. See Complaint p. 12. 
On or about December 13, 1995 Defendant filed Defendant Beuchert Builder's 12(b)(6) 
Motion To Dismiss with an accompanying Memorandum in Support of Defendant Beuchert 
Builder's J2(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. 
On or about December 22, Defendant filed with the Court, Defendant Beuchert 
Builder's, Inc., Ex Parte Motion For Enlargement Of Time. Defendant requested an order 
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enlarging the time in which to respond to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production of Documents. Plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production were 
served on Defendant on or about November 30, 1995. Timely responses would have been 
due on December 22, 1995. 
On or about December 27, 1995, Plaintiff, Valley Colour, filed its Memorandum In 
Opposition To Defendant's Ex Parte Motion For Enlargement Of Time. 
On or about December 27, 1995, Plaintiff also filed its Memorandum In Opposition To 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss. 
On or about January 9, 1996 Beuchert Builders filed Defendant's Reply Memorandum 
In Support Of Its Motion To Dismiss and Ex Parte Motion For Leave To File Overlength 
Memorandum. 
Oral Arguments were held on January 22, 1996 on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
based upon URCP 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
n 
STANDARD FOR RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION 
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Court must "accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Colman v. Utah State Land 
Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co.. 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, all of the allegations in 
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Valley Colour's complaint are assumed to be true, and are to be construed "in a light most 
favorable to the party against whom the Rule 12(b)(6) motion was brought" See State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
Ill 
ISSUES 
It is the contention of the Defendant that the Plaintiffs action is time-barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, leaving no claim before this Court upon which relief can be 
granted. Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1991) contains the applicable 
statute of limitations. Section 78-12-25.5(3) addresses limitation of actions dealing with 
improvements to real property and states: "An action against a provider shall be commenced 
within two years . . ." See U.C.A § 78-12.25.5(3) (1991). Defendant contends that all of 
Plaintiffs claims arise as a result of the agreement entered into regarding the remodeling of a 
residence owned by Plaintiff. Defendant argues therefore, that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 
applies to all seven causes of action listed in Plaintiffs Complaint. 
Further, Defendant claims that the applicable statute of limitation for all seven causes 
of action is found in § 78-12-25.5(3). Defendant argues that the statute of limitations began 
to run in this instance at the time that Defendant allegedly abandoned the remodeling project 
in December of 1991. To be timely under the statute, an action should have been filed within 
two years. The case at bar was filed on or about September 25, 1995. Defendant contends 
that if the applicable statute of limitations is found to be §78-12-25.5(3), then Plaintiffs action 
is time-barred since more than two years elapsed between the date of accrual of the action 
(December 1991) and filing of the action (September 1995). 
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Plaintiff claims that §78-12-25.5(3) does not contain the applicable statute of 
limitations for all causes of action in this matter. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that: 
(1) the breach of contract claims do not fall under the two year limitation of § 78-12-
25.5(3), but rather should be considered timely under the language of §78-12-25.5(4) "no 
action for breach of contract or warranty may be commenced against a provider more than six 
years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction." See U.C.A. § 78-
12-25.5(4). Plaintiff argues that while it is clear that certain, enumerated actions are subject 
to the two year limitation, an action for breach of contract may be commenced up to six years 
after completion or abandonment of the improvement. 
(2) Plaintiff argues that the claims of Slander of Title and Tortious Interference are 
claims arising from Defendant's placement of a mechanics lien on the property, not from the 
performance of construction work and are, therefore, not subject to the two-year statute of 
limitations in §78-12-25.5(3), but rather are subject to the three year statute of limitations 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1) regarding tortious injury to property. 
(3) Plaintiff claims that even if the two-year limitation of §78-12-25.5(3) applies, the 
action is still timely because the two-year period did not start to run until Central Bank sold 
the property in October of 1993, cutting of Plaintiffs right of redemption and establishing 
Plaintiffs damages, as the last event necessary to begin accrual of the cause of action. 
(4) Plaintiff claims that the two year limit found in § 78-12-25.5(3) violates the 
Uniform Operation of Laws and the Private Laws Forbidden sections of the Utah Constitution 
rendering § 78-12-25.5(3) unconstitutional, and therefore the claims are subject to either the 
six year statute of limitations found in §78-12-23 for actions founded upon an instrument in 
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writing or the four year statute of limitations found in §78-12-25 for a contract not founded 
upon an instrument in writing. 
(5) Plaintiff argues that, historically, claims founded on contract principles against 
builders for defective construction were not subject to §78-12-25.5, but rather, are subject to 
the longer statute of limitations found in § 78-12-23 or alternatively §78-12-25. 
IV 
ANALYSIS 
The Applicable Statute of Limitations 
Utah 's policy has been that statutes of limitation are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. To further 
that policy, the general rule has been that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action. See Becton Dickinson and Co.. v. 
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983) and cases cited therein. The case at bar requires a two 
part analysis. The Court must first determine whether the two year statute of limitations 
found in §78-12-25.5(3) applies to all claims involved in this action. Second, the Court must 
determine which act is defined as the last act necessary to trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations under the statute. 
The first issue to be considered is whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1991) applies 
to all the causes of action claimed by the Plaintiff. The section is entitled "Actions Related to 
Improvements in Real Property." 
Subsection (1) defines the terms as used in this section . An "action" is defined as 
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"any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, or breach 
of duty that causes injury to persons or property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, 
strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source of law." See U.C.A. §78-12-25.5(l)(a). 
The term "provider" is defined as "any person contributing to, providing, or 
performing studies, plans, specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, costs or 
quantity estimates, topographic surveys, staking, construction, and the review, observation, 
administration, management, supervision, inspections, and tests of construction for or in 
relation to an improvement." See U.C.A. §78-12-25.5(l)(e). 
The term "improvement" is also defined in the statute as "any building, structure, 
infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or 
alteration to real property." See U.C.A. §78-12-25.5(l)(c). 
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that it entered into an agreement whereby Beuchert 
Builders agreed to perform remodeling construction work at a residential property owned by 
Valley Colour. See Plaintiffs Complaint \ 5. Plaintiff describes the work contemplated as, 
"tile work in the master bath, shower and main bath; electrical work; hardwood floors; roofs; 
skylight, kitchen light; carpentry and sheetrock; kitchen counter tops; appliances; kitchen sink 
and faucet; basement bar; and kitchen cabinets." See Plaintiffs Complaint f 6. 
The Court finds that this action is governed by U.C.A. §78-12-25.5. The title of this 
section describes the causes of action contemplated by the legislature in drafting this statute 
as "actions relating to improvements to real property." Using Plaintiffs own description of 
what the agreement between Valley Colour and Beuchert Builders encompassed, as cited 
above, that description plainly illustrates that the agreement dealt with improvements to real 
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property. 
When construing statutes, the general rule is that a statute is to be construed according 
to its plain language. See Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). Further, "a 
statute should be applied according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. We must assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly by the 
Legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning." Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce. 828 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1992). The Court 
finds that the language of this statute is clear and unambiguous, the wording is neither 
confusing, nor inoperable. The Court will therefore apply it according to its plain language. 
Using the definition of an action as provided in §78-12-25.5(l)(a) an "action" is any 
claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of 
duty that causes injury to persons or property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict 
liability, or other source of law." [emphasis added] U.C.A. §78-12-25.5(l)(a). 
The claims asserted against Defendant are breach of contract, repudiation of the 
contract, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, tortious interference, and slander of title. The Court finds that all of these actions are 
encompassed within the definition of "action" pursuant to the above cited statute. All of these 
claims arise from the agreement made between Valley Colour and Beuchert Builders for 
remodelling work; Valley Colour is making a judicial claim for relief; all of the causes of 
action arise out of an injury to property; all claims can be classified as based either in tort, 
contract or other source of law pursuant to the statute. The Court finds that Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25.5 (1991) applies by its own express definition to all of the claims in Plaintiffs 
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Complaint. 
Next to be considered is the statute of limitations set out in §78-12-25.5(3). In 
relevant part it provides that: 
An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years 
from the date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or 
the date upon which the act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have 
been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the act, error, omission, or 
breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before completion of the 
improvement or abandonment of construction, the two year period begins 
to run upon completion or abandonment. 
Plaintiff argues that those causes of action based upon breach of contract are not 
subject to the two year limitation of § 78-12-25.5(3), but rather should be allowed a six year 
limitation as mentioned in § 78-12-25.5(4). However, a plain reading of subsection (4) 
shows that Plaintiffs argument fails. Subsection (4) provides: 
"Subject to Subsection (3). no action for breach of contract or warranty may be 
commenced against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction." [emphasis added] U.C.A. §78-12-25.5(4) (1991). 
It is clear that the actions discussed in Subsection (4) are to be subject to the time 
limitations of Subsection (3). The legislature created a two year from discovery statute of 
limitations provided it will never exceed six years for claims based in contract, with the added 
caveat that if a claim based on contract or warranty is not discovered until the sixth year, the 
period is extended two more years. See § 78-12-25.5(4). 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs argument that a breach of contract action under § 
78-12-25.5 is subject to the six year limitation mentioned in §78-12-25.5(4) to be erroneous. 
First, subsection (3) clearly specifies that if the act or error is discovered or discoverable 
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before completion of the improvement, then the two year period begins to run upon 
completion or abandonment. Plaintiffs own Complaint states that abandonment occurred in 
December of 1991. 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has held that statutes should be read so as to "avoid 
making any of their provisions surplusage and meaningless." See Downey State Bank v. 
Maior-Blakenev Corp.. 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978). If the Court were to apply the six 
year limitation found in subsection (4), it would be contrary to legislative intent and defeat 
the purpose of Subsection (3) entirely. Plaintiffs with a claim would always allege a breach 
of contract theory in order to take advantage of the longer statute of limitations, rendering 
Subsection (3) a nullity. Subsection (3)'s language is very specific and Plaintiffs cause of 
action falls within its purview. To allow Plaintiff in this case to take advantage of 
Subsection (4) 's six year statute of limitation would make Subsection (3) meaningless. 
Lastly, in construing a statute, courts are to view it as a comprehensive whole rather 
than unrelated collection of provisions. See Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v. Audit Div. of State 
Tax Com'n of Utah. 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992); Sentry Investigations. Inc.. v. Davis. 841 P.2d 
732 (Utah App. 1992); See also, Bagshaw v. Bagshaw. 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 
1990)(applying general rather than specific provision would effectively repeal the specific 
provision). 
The Court must consider the provisions in subsections (3), and (4), as a whole. 
Indeed, the Court must look at §78-12-25.5 as a comprehensive whole, and construe each 
subsection in light of the whole and not in a piecemeal fashion. See Sentry Investigations. 
Inc. v. Davis. 841 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Section §78-12-25.5 was enacted by the legislature to regulate causes of action 
involving "providers" in the construction industry and the general public. See §78-12-25.5(2). 
The purposes of the statute are clearly set out in §78-12-25.5(2) and the Court must consider 
those purposes in construing the several provisions of the statute. The legislature has balanced 
the competing interests and provided for a "tiered" approach to limitations of actions 
involving construction providers and the public. See §78-12-25.5(2) thru (9). 
Subsection(4) is a general provision and to apply that general provision over the more 
specific subsection (3) would effectively repeal the specific provision. 
Further, in this case the Plaintiff had notice of the act, error, omission or breach of 
duty when the Defendant abandoned the project in December of 1991. At that time Plaintiff 
knew he had a cause of action arising from the agreement between the parties. The statute 
specifically provides that if the act is discovered or discoverable before completion of the 
improvement, that the two year period begins to run upon abandonment of construction. See 
U.C.A. §78-12-25.5(3). The Plaintiff had actual notice of his claim due to Defendant's 
abandonment of the project. To attempt to pick and choose between subsections in order to 
extend the time for filing an action would be disingenuous and contrary to the legislature's 
intent. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims founded on contract principles are subject to the 
two year statute of limitations as set forth in §78-12-25.5(3). The Court finds that the event 
triggering the running of the statute of limitations was the Defendant's abandonment of the 
project in December of 1991. Since Plaintiff did not file an action on that "contract" until 
September of 1995, Plaintiffs claims based upon contract principles are barred as being 
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untimely pursuant to the statute. 
With regard to Plaintiffs claims that historically, claims founded upon contract 
principles against builders for defective construction were subject to U.C.A. §78-12-23 or 
§78-12-25 rather than U.C.A. §78-12-25.5, the Court finds that these historical arguments 
were abrogated when the legislature enacted the new 1991 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-25.5. It 
is a general rule of statutory construction that, "where two statutes treat the same subject 
matter, an one statute is general while the other is specific, the specific provision controls." 
See Flovd v. Western Surgical Assoc. Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989); accord 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw. 788 
P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990). 
Sections 78-12-23 and 78-12-25 are general in nature, §78-12-25.5 is specific to 
actions dealing with improvements to real property, and as such is controlling. Therefore, the 
Court finds Plaintiffs claims founded upon contract principles are subject to U.C.A. §78-12-
25.5 and not the more general sections of §78-12-25 or §78-12-23 . 
Slander of Title Claim 
To prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a publication of a 
slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the statement was false, (3) the statement 
was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages. Bass v. 
Planned Management Servs.. Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988) and cases cited therein. "A 
slanderous statement is one that is derogatory or injurious to the legal validity of an owner's 
title or to his or her right to sell or hypothecate the property." Id. 
Plaintiff argues correctly that the special damages rule requires the plaintiff to establish 
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pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated, as in the case of specific lost sales. First 
Security Bank of Utah. N.A.. v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). However, 
case law provides no clear rule as to the exact point at which special damages are 
ascertainable. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Bass that special damages are ordinarily 
proved in a slander of title action by evidence of a lost sale or the loss of some other 
pecuniary advantage, [emphasis added] See Bass v. Planned Management Services. Inc., 761 
P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988). In Bass, the Utah Supreme Court held that attorney fees may be 
recoverable as special damages if incurred to clear title or to undo any harm created by 
whatever slander of title occurred. Id. at 569. 
Plaintiff cites to Gillmor v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995) and Becton v. 
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1993) arguing that these cases stand for the proposition that 
special damages must be shown to complete the cause of action for slander of tile. Plaintiff 
argues that the necessary special damages cannot be ascertained until the property is sold and 
the statutory right of redemption is lost. See Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss at 5. However, these cases do not support Plaintiffs 
position. The Court has been unable to discover any Utah case law holding that the right of 
redemption or foreclosure sale would be the last event necessary to establish special damages 
for the slander of title claim. In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 208 P.2d 956 (Utah 1949) the 
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that a claim for slander of title necessitated a pecuniary 
loss, however, the Court went on to cite to the Restatement of Torts to define what qualifies 
as a loss. "That pecuniary loss which directly and immediately results from the impairment 
of the vendibility of the thing in question caused by publication of the disparaging matter, and 
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the expense of litigation reasonably necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparaging 
upon the property." Id. at 959. 
Defendant placed a mechanic's lien upon the property in February of 1992. A lien is 
understood to denote a legal claim or charge, collectible out of property as security for the 
payment of some debt or obligation. The mechanic's lien filed on the residential property in 
question was for $19,600.00. At the time of filing in February of 1992 Plaintiffs were put on 
notice that they had suffered specific damages. The accrual of the cause of action began at 
that point. Relying upon Bass and Dowse, the court finds that at the very least, Plaintiffs 
could have filed a claim for slander of title to clear title to the property when they had notice 
of the imposition of the lien in February of 1992, and that attorney fees generated by the 
necessity to litigate clearing the title would have been considered a special damage. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs admit that in the Summer of 1992 they tried to obtain 
financing and were turned down allegedly because of the $19,600.00 lien. Even if the Court 
were to consider Plaintiffs argument that some specific amount of damages must be shown in 
order to complete the cause of action for Slander of Title, when Plaintiffs were unable to 
obtain financing because of the lien, specific damages in the amount of at least $19,600.00 
could be shown since plaintiff alleges that because of the lien refinancing was denied. Had 
the title been clear of that obligation, Plaintiff ostensibly could have obtained financing and 
completed the remodeling project. Plaintiffs still did not pursue any action on the claim 
until the filing of the Complaint in September of 1995. 
The Plaintiff could have filed a claim to clear title to the property and remove the 
lien any time after notice of the filing of the lien, and particularly after refinancing was 
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denied. All of the elements necessary for the filing of an action for Slander of Title were in 
place, at the latest by June of 1992. There was no need to wait until a foreclosure sale was 
held to establish special damages sufficient to complete a cause of action for slander of title. 
Plaintiffs argument that the date of the foreclosure sale and/or the date that Plaintiffs right of 
redemption was cut off was the last event necessary fail.1 
Plaintiff has not provided any extenuating circumstances justifying the delay in filing 
the action. Therefore, this Court finds that the special damages needed to complete the cause 
of action for Slander of Tile in this case occurred when the mechanic's lien was filed on the 
property in February of 1992. The Court finds that Plaintiffs claim for Slander of Title was 
subject to the two year statute of limitation found in §78-12-25.5(3) and since filing of the 
claim did not occur until September 25, 1995, the Court finds that claim barred as being 
untimely pursuant to the statute. 
The Court notes that even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs argument that the 
Slander of Tile and Tortious Interference claims were subject to the three year limitation 
found in U.C.A. §78-12-26(1) as a tortious injuries to property, Plaintiffs claims would still 
be untimely. Damages were established at the latest in June of 1992 when Plaintiff could not 
negotiate refinancing due to the imposition of the mechanic's lien. To be timely, a claim 
would have had to have been filed by June of 1995. Plaintiff did not file until September of 
1995. 
xThe Court notes that if it were to accept Plaintiff's 
argument that special damages do not accrue until Plaintifffs 
right of redemption is cut off, in cases of judicial foreclosure, 
that date would be extended another six months until the 
statutory right of redemption was finally cut off. 
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CONSTITUTION A LITY OF THE STATUTE 
It is important to note at the outset that it is a well settled proposition that all statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of 
proving its invalidity. See City of West Jordan v. Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 
1988); Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1979). 
When scrutinizing a legislative measure the Court must determine whether the 
classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative 
purposes. See Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 
1988). 
The statute in question singles out all those involved in the construction of 
improvements to real property by providing a limitation period shorter for claims arising from 
the construction of improvements than for other types of claims. 
As held in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984), there must be a 
reasonable basis to classify this group differently. The legislature clearly has a valid interest 
in limiting the time within which a legal action may be commenced once it arises. In 
general, statutes of limitation are intended to compel the exercise of a right of action within a 
reasonable time and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims so that claims are advanced while 
evidence to rebut them is still fresh. See Burnett v. New York Central R.R.. 380 U.S. 424, 
428 (1965) as cited in Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
The legislature has stated its reasons for classifying this group differently and set out 
its purposes in §78-12-25.5(2). The Court finds that the tiered approach of the amended 1991 
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statute regarding limitations on actions commenced under its auspices is reasonable and 
provides adequate protection for both contractors and for the public. See U.C.A. § 78-12-
25.5(2) (1991). The tiered approach provides a benefit for the public by allowing some 
claims to be brought later than two years and a benefit for providers by protecting them from 
indefinite liability. The Court finds that the statute in question is constitutional and the 
Plaintiff is subject to the time limitations contained in that statute. 
The Court finds that the statute is presumed constitutional and Plaintiff has not offered 
any substantive proof that it is not. Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the 
legislature's methods of accomplishing its purpose are not reasonably related to that desired 
purpose. Because the U.C.A. §78-12-25.5 is constitutional on its face, it bars Plaintiffs 
claims that it violates the Uniform Operation of Laws Provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs arguments that it's claims should be considered under the statute of 
limitations found in either U.C.A. § 78-12-23 or U.C.A. § 78-12-25 fail because U.C.A. §78-
12-25.5 (1991) is constitutional. 
IV 
DECISION 
Having considered the facts and law, and being advised on all premises of the case, 
the Court concludes as follows: 
1. By definition and application of the rules of statutory construction, U.C.A. §78-12-
25.5(1991) applies to all seven of Plaintiff s causes of action listed in the Complaint. 
2. The two-year statute of limitations for actions arising under §78-12-25.5 found in 
Subsection (3) is applicable to all seven of Plaintiffs causes of action listed in the Complaint. 
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3. The statute of limitations began to run for Plaintiffs claims of Breach of Contract, 
Repudiation of Contract; Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, and Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing when Defendant abandoned the remodeling project in December 
of 1991. These claims were not filed within the two-year time limit and are now time-barred. 
4. The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs claims of Slander of Title and Tortious 
Interference began to run in February of 1992 when the mechanic's lien was placed on the 
property for $19, 600. These claims were not filed within the two-year limit and are now 
time-barred. 
5. U.C.A. §78-12-25.5 (1991) is constitutional. 
6. Even accepting all of Plaintiffs factual allegations to be true, and making all 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that as a matter 
of law, Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole by the statute of limitations found in U.C.A. § 
78-12-25.5 (1991), leaving no claim before this Court upon which relief can be granted. 
7. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant Beuchert Builder Inc.'s Rule 12 (b)(6) 
Motion To Dismiss. 
8. Defendant's Motion For Enlargement of Time is now MOOT subject to the Court's 
granting of Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss. 
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9. Counsel for Defendant, Benson L. Hathaway, Jr., is instructed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Decision. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this ^ 7 day of January, 1996. 
^-~y-f^^ 
HOWARD H. MAETANI 
Fourth District Court Judge 
cc: Benson L. Hathaway, Jr., Esq. 
Marty K. Banks, Esq. 
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